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1 Introduction
In this paper, we focus on stratified pooling games as introduced by Schlicher et al. [9].
In these games, there are several players that are located geographically close together.
They each keep spare parts in stock to protect for downtime of their high-tech machines
and face (possibly) different downtime costs per stockout. The players can cooperate by
forming a joint spare parts pool. A stratified pooling policy, which is optimal in terms
of miniming the long-run average costs, is then applied. It determines, depending on
the real-time on-hand inventory, which players may take parts from the joint spare
parts pool. This policy makes it hard to analyse the corresponding games. However,
Schlicher et al. [9] were able to prove core non-emptiness of stratified pooling games,
by formulating the underyling situation (of the game) in terms of a Markov decision
problem (MDP) and the optimal pooling policy as a stationary policy in this MDP.
We consider a natural extension of stratified pooling games by allowing the players to
optimize on the stock level of the joint spare parts pool as well (rather than assuming
that this stock level is -simply- the sum of the stock levels of the individual players as
is the case in the original game). We explictly introduce the costs for holding spare
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
08
14
5v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
0 N
ov
 20
18
parts (which is excluded in the original game as well) such that players face a natural
trade off between these holding costs and the downtime costs (to find the optimal
stock level). For these games, which we call optimized pooling games, we are able
to show core non-emptiness as well. We do so by using a proving technique that has
similarities with the one in Schlicher et al. [9]. Besides the direct consequence of core
non-emptiness, namely that there is an incentive for all players to fully cooperate, this
result is of particular interest as extensions of spare parts pooling games, like (not)
optimizing on stock levels, can (typically) break the core non-emptiness result (see e.g.,
Karsten et al. [2], who show that the core can be empty whenever spare parts levels are
not optimized, and Schlicher et al. [8], who show that applying another type of pooling
can make the difference between an empty and a non-empty core).
In the remainder of this paper, we first describe our new spare parts situation and the
associated optimized pooling game. Then, we present our proof, showing that the core
of any optimized pooling game is non-empty. All proofs of the lemmas are relegated
to the appendix.
2 Model description
In this section, we define the spare parts situation and the associated optimized pooling
game. Besides, we describe how the coalitional values of our games relate to the value
function of a corresponding Markov decision process.
2.1 Spare parts situations
We consider an environment with a finite set N ⊆ N of service providers that are
located geographically close together and each keeps spare parts in stock to prevent
costly downtime of their high-tech machines. We limit ourselves to one critical
component, i.e., one stock-keeping unit, which is subject to failures. For each service
provider i ∈ N, it holds that a failure of a high-tech machine immediately leads to a
demand for a spare part. This occurs according to a Poisson process with rate
λi ∈ R+. We assume that each service provider i ∈ N keeps an initial amount of spare
parts in stock, which is (possibly) restricted by the service provider’s maximal storage
capacity of Ci ∈ N ∪ {0} spare parts. The cost for holding a single spare part is h ∈ R
per time unit per service provider. If a spare part is on hand when demand occurs,
this demand is always satisfied and the failed part is sent to the repair shop of service
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provider i, which repairs such parts one-by-one. Repair times of these parts are
assumed to be independent and identically distributed according to an exponential
distribution with mean µ−1i ∈ R+. If no spare part is available when demand occurs,
an emergency procedure is instigated, which means that a spare part is leased (from
an external supplier with infinite supply) for the duration of the repair time of the
failed component, which is sent to the repair shop (of service provider i). The
expected costs associated with the extra idleness of the machine (due to the delivery
time of a leased spare part), shipment of an emergency spare part, and so on, shortly
called downtime costs, are di ∈ R+ for service provider i. We assume that each service
provider i ∈ N wants to minimize its long-run average costs per time unit. This
implies that each service provider faces a natural trade off between the holding costs
and the downtime costs to determine the optimal amount of spare parts to stock (i.e.,
stock level), while taking into account the maximal storage capacity restriction.
To analyse this setting, we define a spare parts situation as a tuple (N, C, d,λ, h, µ) with
N, C = (Ci)i∈N, d = (di)i∈N, λ = (λi)i∈N, h, and µ = (µi)i∈N as defined above. For
short, we use θ to refer to a spare parts situation and Θ to refer to the set of spare parts
situations.
2.2 Optimized pooling games
Consider spare parts situation θ = (N, C, d,λ, h, µ) and coalition S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅.
The players in coalition S can collaborate by pooling their storage capacities, demand
streams and repair rates into a joint system with a, yet to be determined, base stock
level, a (heterogeneous) demand rate λS = ∑i∈S λi, and a single repair shop, in which
components are repaired one-by-one with as repair rate µS = ∑i∈S µi. In this joint
system, the players face the problem of which (base) stock level to choose and which
demand to accept or reject, such that the long-run average costs are minimized. Here,
we assume that each failed component is sent to the repair shop immediately and that
whenever a demand is rejected (and so the spare part is not satisfied from the joint
spare parts pool), an emergency procedure is instigated (as discussed before), with
downtime costs that depend on whose demand is rejected. We denote the minimal
long-run average costs per time unit for coalition S ⊆ N by cθ(S) and set cθ(∅) = 0.
The associated game (N, cθ) will be called an optimized pooling game.
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2.3 MDP formulation
In line with Schlicher et al. [9] the decision problem per coalition can be considered
as a (discrete time) Markov decision process (MDP) as well. This is allowed since the
decision problem per coalition can be recognized as a semi-Markov decision problem,
which can be converted to an equivalent MDP by applying uniformization (see, e.g.,
Lippman [3]). For that, we add fictitious transitions of a state to itself to ensure that the
total rate out of a state is equal for all states, the so-called uniformization rate. Then, we
consider the embedded discrete-time MDP by looking at the system only at transition
instants, which occur according to a Poisson process, with as rate the uniformization
rate. This modelling technique turns out to be very useful. Let θ ∈ Θ and S ⊆ N with
S 6= ∅. In what follows, we present this corresponding MDP.
2.3.1 State and action spaces
We define the state space to be Y S = {0, 1, . . . , CS} with i ∈ Y S representing the
number of spare parts in stock of coalition S and the action space to be A S(y) ={
A Si,−(y),A
S
i,+(y)
}
i∈S
with A Si,−(y) = {0, 1} for all i ∈ S and all y > 0, A Si,−(0) = {0}
for all i ∈ S, A Si,+(y) = {0, 1} for all i ∈ S and all y < CS and A Si,+(CS) = {0} for all
i ∈ S. For sub action space A Si,−, action 1 corresponds with the acceptance of a demand
at a player, while action 0 corresponds with the rejection of such a demand. For sub
action space A Si,+, action 1 corresponds with the repair of a spare part, while action 0
corresponds with the decision to not repair a(nother) spare part. Note, in comparison
with the original spare parts situation as introduced in Schlicher et al. [9], the players
now have the possibility to decide on the amount of (repairable) spare parts to stock,
which consequently results into an addition action space (A Si,+).
2.3.2 Costs and transition probabilities
Let γ = ∑i∈N [λi + µi]. We will use γ as the uniformization rate, which is independent
of S. In addition, let λ∗i = λi/γ, µ
∗
i = µi/γ for all i ∈ N and h∗ = h/γ. Now, CS(y, a)
denotes the expected costs collected over a single (uniformized) time epoch, given that
the system begins the period in state y ∈ Y S and action a = {a−i , a+i }i∈S ∈ A S(y) is
taken. For our situation, we have
CS(y, a) = ∑
i∈S
λ∗i · (1− a−i ) · di + h∗ · y for all y ∈ Y S and all a ∈ A S(y).
In addition, let pS(y′|y, a) denote the one-stage transition probability from state y ∈ Y S
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to y′ ∈ Y S under action a = {a−i , a+i }i∈S ∈ A S(y). We have
pS(y′|y, a) =

∑
i∈S
λ∗i · a−i if y′ = y− 1, y > 0
∑
i∈S
µ∗i · a+i if y′ = y + 1, y < CS
1−∑
i∈S
[
λ∗i · a−i + µ∗i · a+i
]
if y′ = y
0 otherwise,
for all y ∈ Y S and all a ∈ A S(y).
2.3.3 Value function and equivalence
Now, we present the value function in a form suitable for this paper. This form can be
obtained by some rewriting of the value function in standard form (see, e.g., Schlicher
et al. [9, p.9] for the value function in standard form). The proof, showing how the
value function in standard form can be rewritten into a form suitable for this paper, is
straightforward and for this reason omitted (rather than relegated to the appendix).
Lemma 1. Let θ ∈ Θ and S ⊆ N. For all y ∈ Y S and all t ∈N∪ {0}, we have
VSt+1(y) = ∑
i∈S
[
λ∗i min
l∈{0,min{y,1}}
{
VSt (y− l) + (1− l)di
}
+ µ∗i min
l∈{0,min {1,CS−y}}
VSt (y + l)
]
+ h∗ · y +
(
1−∑
i∈S
[λ∗i + µ
∗
i ]
)
·VSt (y)
and VS0 (y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y S.
Finally, we define gS as the minimal long-run average costs per time epoch of the MDP.
Similarly to Schlicher et al. [9], we show that there is a direct relation between gS and
the original minimal long-run average costs per time unit of coalition S. Recall that
proofs of lemmas are relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 2. Let θ ∈ Θ and S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅. Then
cθ(S) = γ · gS = γ · lim
t→∞
VSt (y)
t
for all y ∈ Y S.
3 Core non-emptiness of optimized pooling games
In this section, we will show that optimized pooling games have a non-empty core. In
doing so, we need to introduce some definitions and well-known results. We closely
follow the formulation as presented in Schlicher et al. [9].
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A map κ : 2N\{∅} → [0, 1] is called a balanced map for N if
∑
S∈2N : i∈S
κS = 1 for all i ∈ N.
A collection B ⊆ 2N\{∅} is called balanced if there exists a balanced map κ for which
κS > 0 for all S ∈ B and κS = 0 otherwise. Moreover, a collection B ⊆ 2N\{∅} is
called minimal balanced if there exists no proper subcollection of B that is balanced as
well. An advantage of minimal balanced collections is that for every minimal balanced
collection B ⊆ 2N\{∅} there exists exactly one associated balanced map κ (Peleg and
Sudhölter [6]). For this balanced map it holds that κS ∈ Q for all S ∈ B (Norde and
Reijnierse [5]). A game (N, c) is called balanced if for every minimal balanced collection
B ⊆ 2N\{∅} with associated balanced map κ it holds that
∑
S∈B
κS · c(S) ≥ c(N).
Now, we are able to present a sufficient and necessary condition for core non-emptiness
due to Bondareva [1] and Shapley [11].
Theorem 1. A game (N, c) is balanced if and only if C (N, c) 6= ∅.
Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. We define α ∈ N as the
smallest integer for which κS · α ∈N for all S ∈ B and use bS = κS · α for all S ∈ B as a
shorthand notation. Note that for these new definitions, we suppress the dependency
on B of α, bS, and κS. So, in order to show balancedness for our optimized pooling
game (N, cθ), it suffices to check if for each B ⊆ 2N\{∅} it holds that
∑
S∈B
bS · cθ(S) ≥ α · cθ(N). (1)
In the remainder of this section, we prove balancedness for our game by showing that
(1) holds for each minimal balanced collection. We use the 5-step proof technique as
introduced by Schlicher et al. [9]. This proof technique consists of several steps, and to
facilitate understanding of the steps we first informally summarize them:
0. Definition of an MDP for each coalition S such that cθ(S) = γ · limt→∞ VSt (y)/t,
where VS is the value function corresponding to the MDP (see Section 2.3).
1. Copy of each coalition S to obtain labeled coalitions (S, k) for k ∈ {1, . . . , bS} and
associated value function VS,k. Express the left-hand size of (1) in terms of VS,k.
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2. Combination of the value functions VS,k for all labeled coalitions (S, k) into a
single value function VB. The combination of this new value function is semi-
cartesian: each individual value function VS,k is retained in VB along with all its
dynamics, while the transitions (due to demand arrivals or repair completions)
are coupled across the individual value functions.
3. Relaxation of the possible transition actions in VB to obtain V̂B. This latter value
function corresponds to a situation where demand of a labeled coalition can be
satisfied using inventory of any labeled coalition and where a repair completion of
a labeled coalition can be used to increase the inventory of any labeled coalition.
4. Anonimization of the state space belonging to V̂B to obtain an MDP that only
keeps track of the total inventory of all labeled coalitions together, with associated
value function Vα. In this MDP demands arrive in batches of size α, and each
repair completion simultaneously returns (at most) α parts to inventory.
5. Uncopy of value function Vα into α-times the value function VN, which is the
value function of the grand coalition.
We next discuss steps 1-5 in detail and present a conclusion which proves (1). We want
to stress that, although we use the proof technique as introduced in Schlicher et al. [9],
the proof itself is new.
1. Copy. For each minimal balanced collection B ⊆ 2N\{∅}, we introduce another set
L that contains for each S ∈ B exactly bs labeled copies of coalition S.
Definition 1. Let θ ∈ Θ andB ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. Then, we define
L =
{
(S, k) | S ∈ B, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bS}
}
.
The labeled copies are called labeled coalitions. For each labeled coalition (S, k) ∈ L
we denote the value function by VS,kt and the capacity by CS,k.
Lemma 3. For every θ ∈ Θ it holds for any minimal balanced collection B ⊆ 2N\{∅} that
∑
S∈B
bS · cθ(S) = γ · lim
t→∞
1
t
· ∑
S∈B
bS
∑
k=1
VS,kt (CS,k).
2. Combination. We show that for any minimal balanced collection B ⊆ 2N\{∅} we
can construct a combined value function (of some unspecified MDP) with a state space
that keeps track of the inventory level of every labeled coalition (S, k) ∈ L , an action
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space that consists of all possible actions per labeled coalition (S, k) ∈ L given its
inventory level, and for which the related costs coincide with ∑S∈B ∑
bS
k=1 V
S,k
t (CS,k) for
all t ∈N∪ {0}. In order to do so, we first introduce a new state space.
Definition 2. Let θ ∈ Θ andB ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. Then, we define
Y B =
{
(rz)z∈L
∣∣∣∣ rz ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Cz} ∀z ∈ L} .
Secondly, we will introduce a new action space.
Definition 3. Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. Then, for all
r ∈ Y B and all i ∈ N we define
A Bi,−(r) =
{
(lz)z∈L
∣∣∣∣ lz ∈ {0, min{1, rz}} ∀z ∈ L : i ∈ Slz = 0 ∀z ∈ L : i 6∈ S
}
A Bi,+(r) =
{
(lz)z∈L
∣∣∣∣ lz ∈ {0, min{1, Cz − rz}} ∀z ∈ L : i ∈ Slz = 0 ∀z ∈ L : i 6∈ S
}
.
Subsequently, we introduce the new value function. We use that || · ||1 is the L1 norm.
Definition 4. Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. Then, for all
r ∈ Y B and all t ∈N∪ {0}, we define the value function as
VBt+1(r) = ∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i min
l∈ABi,−(r)
{
(α− ||l||1)di +VBt (r− l)
}
+ µ∗i min
l∈ABi,+(r)
{
VBt (r + l)
}]
+ h∗ · ||r||1 .
with VB0 (r) = 0 for all r ∈ Y B.
Now, we are able to show for all time moments the equivalence between the costs of
the new value function and ∑S∈B ∑
bS
k=1 V
S,k
t (CS,k).
Lemma 4. Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. Then, for all
r ∈ Y B and all t ∈N∪ {0} it holds that
∑
S∈B
bS
∑
k=1
VS,kt (rS,k) = V
B
t (r).
3. Relaxation. We introduce a value function (related to some unspecified MDP), that
coincides with the value function of Definition 4, except for a relaxed action space. In
order to do so, we first need to introduce this relaxed action space.
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Definition 5. Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. Then, for all
r ∈ Y B and all i ∈ N we define
Â Bi,− (r) =
{
(lz)z∈L
∣∣∣∣ lz ∈N∪ {0} ∀z ∈ L , ∑
z∈L
lz ≤ α, r− l ∈ Y B
}
Â Bi,+ (r) =
{
(lz)z∈L
∣∣∣∣ lz ∈N∪ {0} ∀z ∈ L , ∑
z∈L
lz ≤ α, r + l ∈ Y B
}
The following result is a direct consequence of relaxing the action space. The proof is
straightforward and for this reason omitted (rather than relegated to the appendix).
Lemma 5. Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. Then, for all
r ∈ Y B and all i ∈ N it holds that A Bi,−(r) ⊆ Â Bi,− (r) and A Bi,+(r) ⊆ Â Bi,+ (r).
Now, we present the value function with this relaxed action space.
Definition 6. Let θ ∈ Θ andB ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. For all r ∈ Y B
and all t ∈N∪ {0}, we define
V̂Bt+1(r) = ∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i min
l∈Â Bi,− (r)
{
(α− ||l||1)di + V̂Bt (r− l)
}
+ µ∗i min
l∈Â Bi,+ (r)
{
V̂Bt (r + l)
}]
+ h∗ · ||r||1 .
with V̂B0 (r) = 0 for all r ∈ Y B.
Incorporating a relaxed action space in the new value function leads to related costs
that are smaller than or equal to the original costs of the value function. The proof is
straightforward (by induction on t) and therefore omitted (rather than relegated to the
appendix).
Lemma 6. Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. For all r ∈ Y B
and all t ∈N∪ {0} it holds that
VBt (r) ≥ V̂Bt (r).
4. Anonimization. We introduce a value function (which is related to some unspecified
MDP for which the belongings and decisions of the labeled coalitions are anonimized)
and show cost-equivalence with the one of Definition 6.
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Definition 7. Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. Then, for all
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN} and all t ∈N∪ {0} we define
Vαt+1(j) = ∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i min
l∈{0,..,min{α,j}}
{
(α− l)di +Vαt (j− l)
}
+µ∗i min
l∈{0,..,min{α,α·CN−j}}
Vαt (j + l)
]
+ h∗ · j
with Vα0 (j) = 0 for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN}.
Lemma 7. Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. For all r ∈ Y B it
holds that
V̂Bt (r) = V
α
t (||r||1) for all t ∈N∪ {0}.
5. Uncopy. We identify some interesting properties of Vα.
Lemma 8. Let θ ∈ Θ andB ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. For all t ∈N∪{0}
it holds that
(i) Vαt (j) +V
α
t (j + 2) ≥ 2 ·Vαt (j + 1) for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN − 2};
(ii) Vαt (k + j) +V
α
t (k + j + 2) = 2 ·Vαt (k + j + 1) for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2}
and all k ∈ {0, α, 2α, . . . , (CN − 1)α}.
The properties of Lemma 8 allow us to uncopy value function Vα into α− times value
function VN, i.e., the value function of coalition N.
Lemma 9. Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. For all j ∈
{0, α, . . . , CN · α} and all t ∈N∪ {0} it holds that
Vαt (j) = α ·VNt
(
j
α
)
Conclusion. Now, we integrate the previous steps to demonstrate validity of (1).
Theorem 2. Optimized pooling games are balanced.
Proof : Let θ ∈ Θ and (N, cθ) be the associated optimized pooling game and B ⊆
2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. In addition, let r̂ = (CS,k)(S,k)∈L . Then,
observe that
∑
S∈B
bS · cθ(S) = γ · lim
t→∞
1
t ∑S∈B
bS
∑
k=1
VS,kt (CS,k) ≥ γ · limt→∞
V̂Bt (r̂)
t
= γ · lim
t→∞
Vαt (α · CN)
t
= γ · lim
t→∞ α ·
VNt (CN)
t
= α · cθ(N).
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4 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
The first equality holds by uniformization, which is allowed if transition rates are
bounded and the MDP is multichain (see Puterman [7, p.568]). Notice that interarrival
times of demands as well as repair times are exponentially distributed with rates that
are bounded from above. In addition, for every stationary policy, there exist one or
multiple recurrent classes. Hence, the MDP is multichain. With respect to the second
equality, observe that state space Y S and action space A S of the MDP are finite. In
addition, under stationary policy f = ( fi(y))y∈Y S,i∈S with fi(y) = (1, 1) for all i ∈ S
and all 0 < y < CS and fi(0) = (0, 1) for all i ∈ S and fi(CS) = (1, 0) for all i ∈ S,
every state y ∈ Y S is accessible from any state y′ ∈ Y S after (possibly) some arrivals
and some (one-by-one) repair completions. Hence, the related Markov chain is
irreducible. An irreducible Markov chain with finite state space is positive recurrent
(see e.g., Modica and Poggiolini [4]). Finally, observe that the long-run average costs
per time epoch under policy f are bounded (naturally) by ∑i∈S λ∗i · di + h∗ · CS and as
a result of Sennott [10, Proposition 4.3], the second equality follows. 
Proof of Lemma 3
Let θ ∈ Θ and B ⊆ 2N\{∅} be a minimal balanced collection. It holds that
∑
S∈B
bS · cθ(S) = γ · ∑
S∈B
bS
∑
k=1
lim
t→∞
VS,kt (CS,k)
t
= γ · lim
t→∞
1
t
· ∑
S∈B
bS
∑
k=1
VS,kt (CS,k).
The first equality holds by exploiting all labeled coalitions, Lemma 2, and the fact that
CS,k ∈ Y S,k for all (S, k) ∈ L . The last equality holds as all limits are well-defined and
all sums are finite. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof : This proof is by induction. By definition of the value functions VS,k0 (y) = 0
for all y ∈ Y S,k, and all S ∈ B and all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bS}. Similarly, VB0 (r) = 0 for all
r ∈ R as well. Hence, ∑S∈B ∑bSk=1 VS,k0 (rS,k) = VB0 (r) for all r ∈ R. Let t ∈N∪ {0} and
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assume that ∑S∈B ∑
bS
k=1 V
S,k
t (rS,k) = V
B
t (r) for all r ∈ R. Let r ∈ R. Now, observe that
∑
S∈B
bS
∑
k=1
VS,kt+1(rS,k)
= ∑
S∈B
bS
∑
k=1
(
∑
i∈S
[
λ∗i min
l∈{0,min{1,rS,k}}
{
VS,kt (rS,k − l) + (1− l)di
}
+µ∗i min
l∈{0,min {1,CS−rz}}
VS,kt (rS,k + l)
]
+
(
1−∑
i∈S
[λ∗i + µ
∗
i ]
)
VS,kt (y)
)
+ h∗ · ∑
S∈B
bS
∑
k=1
rS,k
= ∑
S∈B
bS
∑
k=1
(
∑
i∈S
[
λ∗i min
l∈{0,min{1,rS,k}}
{
VS,kt (rS,k − l) + (1− l)di
}
+µ∗i min
l∈{0,min{1,CS−rz}}
VS,kt (rS,k + l)
]
+ ∑
i∈N\S
[
λ∗i V
S,k
t (rS,k) + µ
∗
i V
S,k
t (rS,k)
]+ h∗ · ||r||1
= ∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i
(
∑
S∈B:i∈S
bS
∑
k=1
min
l∈{0,min{rS,k,1}}
{
VS,kt (rS,k − l) + (1− l)di
}
+ ∑
S∈B:i 6∈S
bS
∑
k=1
VS,kt (rS,k)
)
+ µ∗i
(
∑
S∈B:i∈S
bS
∑
k=1
min
l∈{0,min {1,CS−rz}}
VS,k(rS,k + l) + ∑
S∈B:i 6∈S
bS
∑
k=1
VS,kt (rS,k)
)]
+ h∗ · ||r||1
= ∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i ·
(
min
l∈ABi,−(r)
{
∑
S∈B:i∈S
bS
∑
k=1
VS,kt (rS,k − lS,k) + ∑
S∈B:i 6∈S
bS
∑
k=1
VS,kt (rS,k) + (α− ||l||1)di
})
+ µ∗i ·
(
min
l∈ABi,+(r)
{
∑
S∈B:i∈S
bS
∑
i=1
VS,k(rS,k + l) + ∑
S∈B:i 6∈S
bS
∑
i=1
VS,k(rS,k)
})]
+ h∗ · ||r||1
= ∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i ·
(
min
l∈ABi,−(r)
{
VBt (r− l) + (α− ||l||1)di
})
+ µ∗i ·
(
min
l∈ABi,+(r)
{
VBt (r + l)
})]
+ h∗ · ||r||1
=VBt+1(r).
The first equality holds by Lemma 1. The second equality holds as 1− ∑i∈S[λ∗i + µ∗i ]
= ∑i∈N[λ∗i + µ
∗
i ]−∑i∈S[λ∗i + µ∗i ] = ∑i∈N\S[λ∗i + µ∗i ] and the definition of L1 norm. The
third equality holds by conditioning on λ∗i and µ
∗
i for all i ∈ N. The fourth equality
holds as the sum of minima can be rewritten as one minimum and A Bi,+ and A
B
i,−are
defined such that the decisions made for all minima fit. Note that lS,k = 0 if i 6∈ S. The
fifth equality holds by the induction hypothesis. The last equality holds by Definition
4. By the principle of mathematical induction, this completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof : This proof is by induction. By definition of the value functions V̂B0 (r) = 0 for
all r ∈ R and Vα0 (||r||1) = 0 for all r ∈ R. Hence, V̂B0 (r) = Vα0 (||r||1) for all r ∈ R.
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Let t ∈ N ∪ {0} and assume that V̂Bt (r) = Vαt (||r||1) for all r ∈ R. Let r ∈ R. Now,
observe that
V̂Bt+1(r) = ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l∈Â Bi,− (r)
{
(α− ||l||1)di + V̂Bt (r− l)
}
+ ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈Â Bi,+ (r)
{
V̂Bt (r + l)
}
+ h∗ · ||r||1
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
z∈{0,1,...,min{α,||r||1}}
{
min
l∈Â Bi,− (r):||l||1=z
{
(α− z)di + V̂Bt (r− l)
}}
+ ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
z∈{0,1,...,min{α,α·CN−||r||1}}
{
min
l∈Â Bi,+ (r):||l||1=z
V̂Bt (r + l)
}
+ h∗ · ||r||1
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
z∈{0,1,...,min{α,||r||1}}
{(α− z)di +Vαt (||r||1 − z)}
+ ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
z∈{0,1,...,min{α,α·CN−||r||1}}
{
Vαt (||r||1 + z)
}
+ h∗ · ||r||1
=Vαt+1(||r||1).
The first equality holds by Definition 6. The second equality holds by rewriting the
minimum as a two-step minimization. The third equality holds by the induction
hypothesis. The last equality holds by Definition 7. By the principle of mathematical
induction, this completes the proof. 
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Proof of Lemma 8
Proof : First, the value function will be rewritten. For all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN} and all
t ∈N∪ {0}, we have
Vαt+1(j) = ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l∈{0,1,...,min{α,j}}
{
(α− l)di +Vαt (j− l)
}
+ ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{0,...,min{α,α·CN−j}}
{Vαt (j + l)}+ h∗ · j
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
min
l∈{0,1,...,min{α,j}}
{
(j− l)di +Vαt (j− l)
}
+ (α− j)di
]
+ ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{0,...,min{α,α·CN−j}}
{Vαt (j + l)}+ h∗ · j
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
min
l∈{max{0,j−α},...,j}
{
ldi +Vαt (l)
}
+ (α− j)di
]
+ ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{j,...,min{j+α,α·CN}}
{Vαt (l)}+ h∗ · j,
where the second equality holds as (a − l)di = (α − j)di + (j − l)di and (α − j)di is
a constant. The last equality holds by substituting j − l into a new variable and by
substituting j + l into a new variable.
In addition, we define for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN} and all t ∈N∪ {0}
V
α1
t+1(j) = ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l∈{max{0,j−α},...,j}
{
ldi +Vαt (l)
}
V
α2
t+1(j) = ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{j,...,min{j+α,α·CN}}
{Vαt (l)}
V
α3
t+1(j) = h
∗ · j + ∑
i∈N
λ∗i (α− j)di.
Note that Vαt (j) = V
α1
t (j) + V
α2
t (j) + V
α3
t (j) for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN} and all t ∈
N∪ {0}.
(i) Now, we will prove by induction that Vαt (j) + V
α
t (j + 2) ≥ 2 · Vαt (j + 1) for all
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN − 2} and all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. By definition of the value functions
Vα0 (j) = 0 for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN}. Hence, Vα0 (j) + Vα0 (j + 2) ≥ 2 · Vα0 (j + 1) for
all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN − 2}. Let t ∈ N ∪ {0} and assume that Vαt (j) + Vαt (j + 2) ≥
2 ·Vαt (j + 1) for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN − 2}.
We first focus on Vα2t (j), thereafter we focus on V
α1
t (j), and finally we focus on V
α3
t (j).
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Let j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · (CN − 1)− 2}. Now, observe that
V
α2
t+1(j) +V
α2
t+1(j + 2) = ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{j,...,min{j+α,α·CN}}
Vαt (l) + ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{j+2,...,min{j+2+α,α·CN}}
Vαt (l)
= ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l1∈{j,...,j+α}
l2∈{j+2,...,j+α+2}
Vαt (l1) +V
α
t (l2)
≥ 2 ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l3∈{j+1,...,j+α+1}
Vαt (l3)
= 2 ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l3∈{j+1,...,min{j+α+1,α·CN}}
Vαt (l3)
= 2 ·Vα2t+1(j + 1)
The inequality holds by Lemma 10 (see page 22 and page 23) with f (x) = Vαt (x), a = j,
b = j + α, c = d = 2. The last but one equality holds as j ≤ α · (CN − 1)− 2.
Let j ∈ {α · (CN − 1)− 1, α · (CN − 1), . . . , α · CN − 2}. Now, observe that
V
α2
t+1(j) +V
α2
t+1(j + 2) = ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{j,...,min{j+α,α·CN}}
Vαt (l) + ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{j+2,...,min{j+2+α,α·CN}}
Vαt (l)
≥ ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l1∈{j,...,α·CN}
l2∈{j+2,...,α·CN}
{Vαt (l1) +Vαt (l2)}
≥ 2 ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l3∈{j+1,...,α·CN}
Vαt (l3)
= 2 ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l3∈{j+1,...,min{j+1+α,α·CN}}
Vαt (l3)
= 2 ·Vα2t+1(j + 1)
The first inequality holds as adding a possible term to a set from which its minimum
is selected will not increase the minimum. The second inequality holds by Lemma 10
with f (x) = Vαt (x), a = j, b = α · CN, c = 2, and d = 0. The last but one equality holds
as j + 1+ α ≥ α · CN.
So, for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN − 2} it holds that Vα2t+1(j) +V
α2
t+1(j + 2) ≥ 2V
α2
t+1(j + 1).
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Let j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 1}. Now, observe that
V
α1
t+1(j) +V
α1
t+1(j + 2)
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l∈{max{0,j−α},...,j}
{
ldi +Vαt (l)
}
+ ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l∈{max{0,j+2−α},...,j+2}
{
ldi +Vαt (l)
}
≥ ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l1∈{0,...,j}
l2∈{0,...,j+2}
{
(l1 + l2)di +Vαt (l1) +V
α
t (l2)
}
≥ 2 ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l3∈{0,1,...,j+1}
{Vαt (l3) + l3di}
}
= 2 ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l3∈{max{0,j+1−α},...,j+1}
{Vαt (l3) + l3di}
}
= 2V
α1
t+1(j + 1).
The first inequality holds as adding a (possible) term to a set from which its minimum
is selected will not increase the minimum. The second inequality holds by Lemma 10
with f (x) = Vαt (x) + x · di (which is convex as the sum of a convex function (Vαt (x))
and a linear function (x · di) is still convex), a = 0, b = j, c = 0, and d = 2. The last but
one equality holds as j + 1− α ≤ 0.
Let j ∈ {α, α+ 1, . . . , α · CN − 2}. Now, observe that
V
α1
t+1(j) +V
α1
t+1(j + 2)
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l∈{max{0,j−α},...,j}
{
ldi +Vαt (l)
}
+ ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l∈{max{0,j+2−α},...,j+2}
{
ldi +Vαt (l)
}
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l1∈{j−α,...,j}
l2∈{j+2−α,...,j+2}
{
(l1 + l2)di +Vαt (l1) +V
α
t (l2)
}
≥ 2 ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l3∈{j+1−α,...,j+1}
{Vαt (l3) + l3di}
}
= 2 ∑
i∈N
λ∗i min
l3∈{max{0,j+1−α},...,j+1}
{Vαt (l3) + l3di}
}
.
= 2V
α1
t+1(j + 1).
The first inequality holds by Lemma 10 with f (x) = Vαt (x) + x · di (which is convex
as the sum of a convex function (Vαt (x)) and a linear function (x · di) is still convex),
a = j− α, b = j, c = 2, and d = 2. The last but one equality holds as j + 1− α ≤ 0.
So, for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN − 2} it holds that Vα1t+1(j) +V
α1
t+1(j + 2) ≥ 2V
α1
t+1(j + 1).
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Let j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN − 2}. Now, observe that
V
α3
t+1(j) +V
α3
t+1(j + 2) = h
∗ · j + ∑
i∈N
λ∗i (α− j)di + h∗ · (j + 2) + ∑
i∈N
λ∗i (α− (j + 2))di
= 2 · h∗ · (j + 1) + 2 ∑
i∈N
λ∗i (α− (j + 1))di
= 2 ·Vα3t+1(j + 1).
So, for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN − 2} it holds that Vα3t+1(j) +V
α3
t+1(j + 2) ≥ 2V
α3
t+1(j + 1).
We conclude, for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN − 2}, it holds that
Vαt+1(j) +V
α
t+1(j + 2) = V
α1
t+1(j) +V
α2
t+1(j) +V
α3
t+1(j) +V
α1
t+1(j + 2) +V
α2
t+1(j + 2) +V
α3
t+1(j + 2)
≥ 2Vα1t+1(j + 1) + 2V
α2
t+1(j + 1) + 2V
α3
t+1(j + 1)
= 2Vαt+1(j + 1).
(ii) By definition of the value functions Vα0 (j) = 0 for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN}. Hence,
Vα0 (k + j) + V
α
0 (k + j + 2) = 2 · Vα0 (k + j + 1) for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α − 2} and all k ∈
{0, α, 2α, . . . , (CN − 1)α}. Let t ∈N∪ {0} and assume that Vαt (k + j) +Vαt (k + j + 2) =
2 ·Vαt (k + j + 1) for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2} and all k ∈ {0, α, 2α, . . . , (CN − 1)α}.
First, observe that function Vαt (j) + j · di is convex in j for all i ∈ N as Vαt (·) is convex
by (i) and j · di is linear. By our induction hypothesis, it holds that Vαt (k + j) +Vαt (k +
j + 2) = 2 · Vαt (k + j + 1) for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α − 2} and all k ∈ {0, α, 2α . . . , (CN −
1)α}, which implies that Vαt (j) + j · di is also piecewise linear. So, there exists a p ∈
{0, α, 2α, . . . , . . . , CNα} for which it holds that Vαt (p) + p · di ≤ Vαt (j) + j · di for all j ∈
{0, 1, . . . , α · CN} and all i ∈ N. We fix such a p and denote it by p∗ ∈ {0, α, . . . , CN · α}.
Then, for all k ∈ {0, α, . . . , p∗ − α} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α} it holds that
Vα1t+1(k + j) = ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
min
l∈{max{0,k+j−α},...,k+j}
{
ldi +Vαt (l)
}]
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
(k + j)di +Vαt (k + j)
]
,
(2)
where the second equality holds, because the minimum of convex function Vαt (j)+ j · di
is attained at j = p∗ and so the minimum in the first equality is attained at k + j.
For k = p∗ and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α} it holds that
Vα1t+1(k + j) = ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
min
l∈{max{0,k+j−α},...,k+j}
{
ldi +Vαt (l)
}]
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
k · di +Vαt (k)
]
,
(3)
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where the second equality results from the fact that the minimum of Vαt (j) + j · di is
attained at j = p∗ and so the minimum in the first equality is attained at k(= p∗).
For all k ∈ {p∗ + α, p∗ + 2 · α, . . . , (CN − 1) · α} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α} it holds that
Vα1t+1(k + j) = ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
min
l∈{max{0,k+j−α},...,k+j}
{
ldi +Vαt (l)
}]
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
(k + j− α)di +Vαt (k + j− α)
]
,
(4)
where the second equality results from the fact that the minimum of Vαt (j) + j · di is
attained at j = p∗ and so the minimum in the first equality is attained at k + j− α.
So, for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p∗ − α} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2}, we have
Vα1t+1(k + j) +V
α1
t+1(k + j + 2)
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
Vαt (k + j) + (k + j) · di
]
+ ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
Vαt (k + j + 2) + (k + j + 2) · di
]
=2 ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
Vαt (k + j + 1) + (k + j + 1) · di
]
=2Vα1t+1(k + j + 1).
,
where the first equality holds by (2) and the second one by the induction hypothesis.
For k = p∗ and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2} it holds that
Vα1t+1(k + j) +V
α
t+1(k + j + 2)
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
Vα1t (k) + k · di
]
+ ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
Vαt (k) + k · di
]
=2 ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
Vαt (k) + k · di
]
=2Vα1t+1(k + j + 1),
where the first equality holds by (3). The second equality holds by the induction
hypothesis.
For all k ∈ {p∗ + α, p∗ + 2 · α, . . . , (CN − 1) · α} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2} it holds that
Vα1t+1(k + j) +V
α1
t+1(k + j + 2)
= ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
Vαt (k + j− α) + (k + j− α)di
]
+ ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
Vαt (k + j + 2− α) + (k + j− α+ 2)di
]
=2 ∑
i∈N
λ∗i
[
Vαt (k + j + 1− α) + (k + j− α+ 1)di
]
=2Vα1t+1(k + j + 1),
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where the first equality holds by (4) and the second equality by the induction
hypothesis.
We conclude that for all k ∈ {0, α, . . . , α · (CN − 1)} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2} we have
Vα1t (k + j) +V
α1
t (k + j + 2) = 2 ·Vα1t (k + j + 1). (5)
Recall that Vαt (·) is convex by (i). By our induction hypothesis, it holds that
Vαt (k + j) + V
α
t (k + j + 2) = 2 · Vαt (k + j + 1) for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α − 2} and all
k ∈ {0, α, 2α . . . , (CN − 1)α}. So, there exists a p ∈ {0, α, 2α, . . . , . . . , CNα} for which it
holds that Vαt (p) ≤ Vαt (j) for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α · CN} and all i ∈ N. We fix such a p
and denote it by p˜ ∈ {0, α, . . . , CN · α}. Note that p∗ and p˜ do not coincide necessarily.
Now, for all k ∈ {0, α, . . . , p∗ − 2α} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α} it holds that
Vα2t (k + j) = ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{k+j,...,min{k+j+α,α·CN}}
Vαt (l)
= ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (k + j + α),
(6)
where the second equality holds as the minimum of convex function Vαt (l) is attained
at l = p˜ and so the minimum in the first equality is attained at k + j + α.
For k = p˜− α and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α} it holds that
Vα2t (k + j) = ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{k+j,...,min{k+j+α,α·CN}}
Vαt (l)
= ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t ( p˜),
(7)
where the second equality results from the fact that the minimum of Vαt (l) is attained
at l = p˜ and so the minimum in the first equality is attained at p˜.
For all k ∈ { p˜, p˜ + α, . . . , (CN − 1) · α} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α} it holds that
Vα2t (k + j) = ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
l∈{k+j,...,min{k+j+α,α·CN}}
Vαt (l)
= ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (k + j),
(8)
where the second equality results from the fact that the minimum of Vαt (l) is attained
at l = p˜ and so the minimum in the first equality is attained at k + j.
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So, for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p˜− 2α} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2}, we have
Vα2t+1(k + j) +V
α2
t+1(k + j + 2)
= ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (k + j + α) + ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (k + j + 2+ α)
=2 ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (k + j + 1+ α)
=2Vα2t+1(k + j + 1),
where the first equality holds by (6) and the second equality holds by the induction
hypothesis.
For k = p˜− α and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2} it holds that
Vα2t+1(k + j) +V
α2
t+1(k + j + 2)
= ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (h) + ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (h)
=2 ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (h)
=2Vα2t+1(k + j + 1),
where the first equality holds by (7) and the second equality holds by the induction
hypothesis.
For all k ∈ { p˜, p˜ + α, . . . , (CN − 1) · α} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2} it holds that
Vα2t+1(k + j) +V
α2
t+1(k + j + 2)
= ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (k + j) + ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (k + j)
=2 ∑
i∈N
µ∗i V
α
t (k + j)
=2Vα2t+1(k + j + 1),
where the first equality holds by (8) and the second equality holds by the induction
hypothesis.
We conclude that for all k ∈ {0, α, . . . , α · (CN − 1)} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2} we have
Vα2t+1(k + j) +V
α2
t+1(k + j + 2) = 2 ·Vα2t+1(k + j + 1). (9)
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Moreover, for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , (CN − 1)α} and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 2} we have
Vα3t+1(k + j) +V
α3
t+1(k + j + 2) =h
∗(k + j) + ∑
i∈N
λ∗i (α− j)di
+ h∗(k + j + 2) + ∑
i∈N
λ∗i (α− (j + 2))di
=2h∗(k + j + 1) + 2 ∑
i∈N
λ∗i (α− (j + 1))di
=2Vα3t+1(k + j + 1).
(10)
By combining (8), (9) and (10), we have for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , (CN − 1)α} and all j ∈
{0, 1, . . . , α− 2}
Vαt+1(k + j) +V
α
t+1(k + j + 2) =V
α1
t+1(k + j) +V
α2
t+1(k + j) +V
α3
t+1(k + j)
+Vα1t+1(k + j + 2) +V
α2
t+1(k + j + 2) +V
α3
t+1(k + j + 2)
=2 · (Vα1t+1(k + j + 1) +Vα2t+1(k + j + 1) +Vα3t+1(k + j + 1))
=2 ·Vαt+1(k + j + 1),
where the second equality follows from (5), (9), and (10). By the principle of
mathematical induction, this completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 9
Proof : Based on (i) and (ii) of Lemma 8, it follows directly that for all j ∈ {0, α, . . . , α ·
CN} and all t ∈N∪ {0} it holds that
Vαt+1(j) = ∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i min
l∈{0,min{j,α}}
{Vαt (j− l) + (α− l)di}
]
+ ∑
i∈N
[
µ∗i min
l∈{0,min{α,CN−j}}
{Vαt (j + l)}
]
+ h∗ · j
By definition of the value functions Vα0 (j) = 0 for all j ∈ {0, α, . . . , CN · α} and VN0 (j) = 0
for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , CN}. Hence, Vα0 (j) = α · VN0
(
j
α
)
for all j ∈ {0, α, . . . , CN · α}. Let
t ∈N∪ {0} and assume that Vαt (j) = α ·VNt
(
j
α
)
for all j ∈ {0, α, . . . , CN · α}.
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Let j ∈ {0, α, . . . , CN · α}. Then, observe that
Vαt+1(j) = ∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i min
l∈{0,min{j,α}}
{Vαt (j− l) + (α− l)di}
]
+ ∑
i∈N
[
µ∗i min
l∈{0,min{α,αCN−j}}
{Vαt (j + l)}
]
+ h∗ · j
= ∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i min
l∈{0,min{j,α}}
{
α ·VNt
(
j− l
α
)
+ (α− l)di
}]
+ ∑
i∈N
[
µ∗i min
l∈{0,min{α,αCN−j}}
{
α ·VNt
(
j + l
α
)}]
+ h∗ · j
= ∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i min
z∈{0,min{ jα ,1}}
{
α ·VNt
(
j
α
− z
)
+ α · (1− z)di
}]
+ ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
z∈
{
0,min
{
1,CN− jα
}}
{
α ·VNt
(
j
α
+ z
)}+ α · h∗ · j
α
=α ·
(
∑
i∈N
[
λ∗i min
z∈{0,min{ jα ,1}}
{
VNt
(
j
α
− z
)
+ (1− z)di
}]
+ ∑
i∈N
µ∗i min
z∈
{
0,min
{
1,CN− jα
}}
{
VNt
(
j
α
+ z
)}+ h∗ · j
α

=α ·VNt+1
(
j
α
)
.
The first equality holds by definition. The second equality holds by the induction
hypothesis. The third equality holds by introducing a new variable z = l/α. The
fourth equality holds by the induction hypothesis (again). The fifth equality holds as
α can be taken outside the summations. The last equality holds by Lemma 1. By the
principle of mathematical induction, this completes the proof. 
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Lemma 10. Let f : N → with f (x) + f (x + 2) ≥ 2 · f (x + 1) for all x ∈ N and a, b ∈ N
with a ≤ b, c, d ∈ {0, 2} and a + c ≤ b + d. Then, it holds that
min
x∈{a,a+1,...,b}
y∈{a+c,a+c+1...,b+d}
{ f (x) + f (y)} ≥ 2 min
z∈{a+ c2 ,a+ c2+1,...,b+ d2}
{ f (z)} .
Proof of Lemma 10
Let x, y ∈N. Observe that
min
x∈{a,a+1,...,b}
y∈{a+c,a+c+1,...,b+d}
{ f (x) + f (y)}
≥min
[{
f (z) + f (z + 1)|z = a + c
2
, . . . , b +
d
2
− 1
}
∪
{
2 f (z)|z = a + c
2
, . . . , b +
d
2
}]
≥ min
{
2 f (z) | z = a + c
2
, . . . , b +
d
2
}
= 2 min
z∈{a+ c2 ,a+ c2+1,...,b+ d2}
{ f (z)} .
The first inequality holds by midpoint convexity, i.e., the fact that f (x) + f (y) ≥
f
(⌊
x+y
2
⌋)
+ f
(⌈
x+y
2
⌉)
, which holds true as long as f is convex (see e.g. [Murato,
2006, Thm. 1.2]). The second inequality holds as min{2a, a + b, 2b} = min{2a, 2b} for
any a, b ∈ R. The last equality follows by taking (constant) 2 outside the minimum.
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